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Can one have imaginative access to experiential perspectives vastly dif-
ferent from one’s own? Can one successfully imagine what it’s like to 
live a life very different from one’s own? These questions are particularly 
pressing in contemporary society as we try to bridge racial, ethnic, and 
gender divides. Yet philosophers have often expressed considerable pes-
simism in this regard, a pessimism that is mirrored in non-philosophical
contexts throughout popular culture and public discourse. It is often 
thought that the gulf between vastly different experiential perspectives 
cannot be bridged. In this chapter, I explore the case for this pessimism. 
As I will suggest, the case is considerably weaker than it is usually 
thought. 
12.1 Pessimism: The Basic Idea 
To fesh out the pessimistic position, I want to start with its expression 
in popular culture and public discourse. Expressions of pessimism about 
one’s ability to understand experiential perspectives vastly different from 
one’s own are commonplace in these contexts and occur in a variety of 
media about a variety of experiential perspectives. 
Consider, for example, the song “Til It Happens to You” by Lady 
Gaga. The song’s narrator is a sexual assault survivor who powerfully 
conveys the sense that you can’t know what it’s like to be such a person 
unless you have been sexually assaulted yourself: 
’Til it happens to you, you don’t know 
How it feels 
How it feels 
’Til it happens to you, you won’t know 
It won’t be real (how could you know?) 
No it won’t be real (how could you know?) 
Won’t know how I feel 
’Til your world burns and crashes 
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’Til you’re standing in my shoes, I don’t wanna hear nothing 
from you 
From you, from you, ’cause you don’t know 
Among the many arresting images in the video for the song is one of a
woman’s arms with “Listen” and “You Will Hear Me” written across them. 
Another example comes in the musical Hamilton. After Philip Ham-
ilton is killed in a duel, his parents Alexander and Eliza must cope with 
tremendous grief. In the musical number, “It’s Quiet Uptown,” parental 
grief is portrayed as both indescribable and unimaginable to those who 
have not experienced it: 
There are moments that the words don’t reach 
There is suffering too terrible to name 
You hold your child as tight as you can 
Then push away the unimaginable 
These frst two examples focus on differences in experiential 
perspective – what it is like to be a sexual assault survivor, what it is 
like to be a grieving parent – that arise from a formative event or series 
of events. But differences in experiential perspective also may arise from 
social positionality. Here too, the standard treatment of these differ-
ences in popular culture and public discourse sees them as unbridgeable. 
Consider discussions of racial relations in America. In an audio story 
published by The New York Times, black poet Claudia Rankine (Ran-
kine 2015) notes the limitations that face white people when trying to 
understand what it is like to be black: 
Though the white liberal imagination likes to feel temporarily bad 
about black suffering, there really is no mode of empathy that can 
replicate the daily strain of knowing that as a black person you can 
be killed for simply being black: no hands in your pockets, no play-
ing music, no sudden movements, no driving your car, no walking 
at night, no walking in the day, no turning onto this street, no en-
tering this building, no standing your ground, no standing here, no 
standing there, no talking back, no playing with toy guns, no living 
while black. 
A similar idea is often expressed in philosophical contexts as well. For 
example, Paul Gilroy notes in Postcolonial Melancholia that “Racial 
difference obstructs empathy and makes ethnocentrism inescapable. It 
becomes impossible even to imagine what it is like to be somebody else” 
(Gilroy 2005, 63). 
Note the strength of the claims here briefy surveyed. What it’s 
like to occupy an experiential perspective different from one’s own is 
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something that can’t be known (as in Lady Gaga’s question, “how could 
you know?”) or even imagined (as in the claim of unimaginability in 
Hamilton and even more explicitly in Gilroy). The unknowability and 
unimaginability are meant to be in principle, not merely in practice. 
I call this the Epistemic Inaccessibility claim. 
Epistemic Inaccessibility: Any experiential perspective vastly different 
from the one a person occupies is epistemically inaccessible to that 
person. 
While this claim may seem plausible on its face, and while it is certainly 
widely accepted as plausible, I’m not sure that we should be so easily 
convinced of its truth. In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore the 
case for Epistemic Inaccessibility in an effort to determine whether and 
to what extent we have good reason to believe it. 
Here it may help to put some of my cards on the table. As a general 
matter, I am an optimist about imagination. I am optimistic that it can 
play a role in justifying our beliefs, for example, and I am also optimistic 
that we can (at least in principle) imagine a wider range of things than is 
typically recognized (e.g., Kind 2016, Kind 2018, Kind 2020). But this 
chapter is not meant to make a general case for the optimist position, 
nor is it even meant to make a specifc case for optimism with respect to 
bridging experiential divides. I won’t try to establish the conclusion that 
a person can have epistemic access to experiential perspectives differ-
ent from their own. Rather, I will attempt something considerably more 
modest – namely, to make room for the denial of pessimism, or at least, 
the particularly deep form of pessimism associated with the Epistemic 
Inaccessibility claim. 
The frst part of this consists in exploring the case that can be made 
for Epistemic Inaccessibility. As I will suggest, once this case is feshed 
out, it cannot stand up to close scrutiny. But if this is right, then a ques-
tion immediately arises. Why would so many people, philosophers and 
non-philosophers alike, assume that Epistemic Inaccessibility is obvious, 
so obvious perhaps that it needn’t even be argued for?1 The answer is 
straightforward: A commitment to Epistemic Inaccessibility appears to 
be required by plausible principles about respect and humility. Thus, 
the second part of making room for the denial of pessimism consists in 
showing why this is mistaken. As I will suggest, the denial of Epistemic 
Inaccessibility does not entail that one is either disrespectful or inappro-
priately arrogant. 
Though the examples given above were drawn mainly from popular 
culture and public discourse, in what follows I’ll turn to the philosophi-
cal literature. I’ll start by considering arguments that might be adduced 
in support of Epistemic Inaccessibility. Though these arguments are of-
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thought implicit in philosophical discussions of these issues. I call these 
the Epistemic Arrogance argument and the Too Big a Gulf argument. In 
the following two sections, I’ll consider these in turn. As I’ll suggest, nei-
ther of these arguments is successful in making the case for pessimism. 
Though this opens the door to a more optimistic approach, I conclude by 
refecting on the need to proceed with caution in this regard. 
12.2 The Epistemic Arrogance Argument 
To start, it would be helpful to clarify how I’m understanding the notion 
of experiential perspective. On the one hand, we sometimes talk of in-
dividual experiential perspectives – what it’s like to be Christine Blasey 
Ford, or to be Alexander Hamilton, or to be Serena Williams. On the 
other hand, we sometimes talk of broader experiential perspectives – 
what it’s like to be the survivor of sexual assault, or to be a parent who 
has lost a child, or to be black in America. In talking the latter way, 
though one need not assume that the perspectives are monolithic, one 
nonetheless treats the experiential perspective as a broad and shareable 
type. It’s this latter, broad notion of experiential perspective that I’ll be 
working with in what follows. 
To many, the problem with optimism about bridging the divide be-
tween two types of vastly different experiential perspectives seems 
deeper than mere falsity. If we think as a general matter that experien-
tial divides can be bridged, then we are likely to think in at least some 
particular cases that an experiential divide has been bridged. But this 
latter thought is taken to embody a certain kind of arrogance. Perhaps 
it’s even offensive. We saw a hint of this reaction in the lyrics from Lady 
Gaga, above: “I don’t wanna hear nothing from you.” A more detailed 
development of this concern can be found in the philosophical literature 
in connection with what I’m calling the Epistemic Arrogance argument. 
The Epistemic Arrogance argument has its root in the idea that the 
attempt to imagine someone else, particularly someone in a vastly differ-
ent experiential perspective, is fraught with danger. Sometimes this dan-
ger is cast as a kind of insensitivity. Consider, for example, this passage 
from Laurence Thomas: 
If a woman has been raped, it is clear that the last thing in the world 
that a […] man should say to her is ‘I can imagine how you feel.’ 
[…] Few actions could be more insensitive to victims of rape than a 
man’s supposition that via a feat of imagination he can get a grip on 
the pain that a female victim of rape has experienced. 
(Thomas 1998, 361) 
Thomas also casts this danger more specifcally as a kind of moral fail-
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grasp the experiences of a Holocaust survivor by way of “rational imag-
inative role-taking,” this would, he says, be “moral hubris of the worst
sort” (Thomas 1998, 360). For Iris Marion Young, the moral failing is
cast as a failing of humility. On her view, when one shows moral humility, 
one starts with the assumption that one cannot see things from the 
other’s perspective and waits to learn by listening to the other per-
son to what extent they have had similar experiences. If I assume 
that there are aspects of where the other person is coming from that 
I do not understand, I will be more likely to be open to listening 
to the specifc expression of their experience, interests, and claims. 
Indeed, one might say that this is what listening to a person means. 
(Young 1997, 49) 
In contrast, when one starts with the assumption that one does have 
imaginative access to a different experiential perspective, one does not 
show this kind of moral humility. Starting with this kind of assumption, 
on her view, is more likely to impede communication than to facilitate 
it, for you will be disinclined to listen to the other person and will likely 
become defensive if they confront you about any misunderstandings (see 
Young 1997, 48–9). 
In what follows, I’ll use “epistemic arrogance” as a relatively broad 
catch-all that also captures issues of insensitivity, disrespect, and lack 
of moral humility. We can thus capture the sentiments expressed by 
Thomas and Young with something like the following argument: 
1  The imaginative project of trying to imagine experiential perspec-
tives vastly different from one’s own displays a certain kind of epis-
temic arrogance. 
2  This kind of epistemic arrogance is morally problematic. 
3  Thus, individuals should refrain from engaging in the imaginative 
project of trying to imagine experiential perspectives vastly different 
from their own. 
Let’s take this schematization as a canonical statement of the Epistemic 
Arrogance argument. Later, I’ll return to the question of whether this 
is a good argument. For now, however, what’s important to note is that 
even if the argument is wholly successful, it doesn’t get to the conclusion 
that the pessimist is looking for. This argument tells us that attempt-
ing to cross experiential divides via imagination is something that we 
shouldn’t do, not something that we can’t do. As such, it doesn’t present 
us with an argument for Epistemic Inaccessibility. 
Perhaps we can tease out a related argument in the vicinity that is 
lurking behind these sorts of concerns about epistemic arrogance. We 
can see it expressed, perhaps, in this passage from Elizabeth Spelman: 
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If we reflect a moment on why imagination may seem necessary in 
this situation – where a member of an oppressor group is trying to 
learn about a member of the oppressed group – we can see why it 
is also dangerous […] If we already knew a lot about each other, I 
wouldn’t have to use my imagination in this way to enter into your 
world, any more than I would have to, to understand my own. But 
if I only rely on my imagination to think about you and your world, 
I’ll never come to know you and it.
(Spelman 1988, 179)
Like Thomas and Young, Spelman takes this kind of imaginative 
project, i.e., the project of attempting to cross experiential divides via 
imagination, to be dangerous. And I take it that she would endorse the 
Epistemic Arrogance argument outlined above. But unlike the above 
passages from Thomas and Young, this passage from Spelman moves 
from a claim about this danger to a claim that sounds closer to an ex-
pression of Epistemic Inaccessibility. In claiming that someone engaged 
in this imaginative project will never come to know the experiential per-
spective of another, Spelman seems to be endorsing the claim that this 
kind of imaginative project cannot, in principle, be successful.
This itself is not Epistemic Inaccessibility, as it leaves open the possibil-
ity that there are other ways to learn about a different experiential per-
spective. But can we get there from what’s already been said? Let’s leave 
aside the question of whether Spelman herself would endorse Epistemic 
Inaccessibility, as sorting this out would require a longer discussion of 
her work than can be accomplished here. Instead, let’s just explore how 
we might use the considerations Spelman has offered to mount a defense 
of Epistemic Inaccessibility. As best as I can determine it, the argument 
would have to go something like this:
1  Imagination can only enable us to understand an experiential per-
spective that we already know a lot about.
2  Experiential perspectives vastly different from our own are not ones 
we already know a lot about.
3  Thus, imagination cannot enable us to understand experiential per-
spectives vastly different from our own.
4  But since those perspectives are vastly different from our own, there 
is no other way for us to gain this knowledge.
5  Thus, experiential perspectives vastly different from one’s own are 
epistemically inaccessible.
But note something interesting here: Considerations about epistemic 
arrogance don’t seem to be doing any work in this argument. Rather, 
what’s doing the work seems to be the thought that when it comes to 
some differences between experiential perspectives, there is just too big 
 
 
Bridging the Divide 243 
a divide to cross imaginatively. But that’s a different argument – in fact, 
it’s the kind of argument that, as I mentioned earlier, I call the Too Big 
a Gulf argument. 
I thus propose to proceed as follows. In the next section, I’ll look more 
closely at the Too Big a Gulf argument. As I’ll suggest, that argument 
cannot succeed in establishing the kind of deep pessimism that motivates 
Epistemic Inaccessibility. In the course of that discussion, however, the 
kinds of concerns that motivate the Epistemic Arrogance argument will 
return to the fore. Though I do not think these concerns give us reason 
for pessimism, they do give us good reason to worry that the denial of 
Epistemic Inaccessibility might confict with other values that are im-
portant to us. Thus, in the fnal section of this chapter, I will attempt to 
address those concerns. 
12.3 The Too Big a Gulf Argument 
One clear expression of the Too Big a Gulf argument comes in Thomas 
Nagel’s famous paper, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (Nagel 1974). 
Though both humans and bats are mammals, our species are very differ-
ent from one another in all sorts of ways. Some of these ways are fairly 
superfcial, but some are considerably more fundamental. For example, 
while humans navigate the world primarily by way of our senses of sight 
and hearing, bats navigate the world by way of their sense of echoloca-
tion. As Nagel notes, we can’t really experience what a bat does when it 
is using its echolocation to navigate the world.2 Given how central one’s 
sensory capacities are to one’s experiential perspective of the world, Na-
gel takes this difference to be of critical importance. 
The fact that we can’t have this kind of experience, or even anything 
close to it, leads Nagel to conclude that the bat’s experiential perspec-
tive is also closed off to us in imagination. The problem, he says, is that 
our own experiential resources on this matter are too impoverished. We 
don’t have what we need to latch on in imagination to the bat’s experi-
ential perspective: 
Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagina-
tion, whose range is therefore limited. It will not help to try to imag-
ine that one has webbing on one’s arms, which enables one to fy 
around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one’s mouth; that one 
has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a sys-
tem of refected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends 
the day hanging upside down by one’s feet in an attic. In so far as 
I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it 
would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the 
question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I 
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and those resources are inadequate to the task. I cannot perform it 
either by imagining additions to my present experience, or by imag-
ining segments gradually subtracted from it, or by imagining some 
combination of additions, subtractions, and modifcations. 
(Nagel 1974, 439) 
Thus, since we can’t experience what it’s like to be a bat, and we can’t 
imagine what it’s like to be a bat, we have no epistemic access to what 
it’s like to be a bat. There is just too big a gulf between the bat and the 
human. 
Now the gulf between a human and a bat is wider than the gulf be-
tween any one human and any other human, no matter how different 
the experiences the two humans have or how different the experiential 
perspectives the two humans occupy. But Nagel is also explicit that the 
same kind of unbridgeable gulf that exists between the human and the 
bat exists in some cases between two different humans. In particular, 
he suggests we consider the imaginative gulf between someone who has 
the capacities for both hearing and seeing and someone who lacks these 
capacities:
The problem is not confned to exotic cases, however, for it exists 
between one person and another. The subjective character of the 
experience of a person deaf and blind from birth is not accessible to 
me, for example, nor presumably is mine to him. 
(Nagel 1974, 440) 
In this way, Nagel seems to endorse Epistemic Inaccessibility. But some 
of his further comments muddy the waters. For Nagel explicitly cautions 
us against overgeneralizing this point: “It is often possible to take up a 
point of view other than one’s own, so the comprehension of such facts 
is not limited to one’s own case” (Nagel 1974, 441–2). To sort this out, 
it will be helpful to be clear about what the proponent of Epistemic In-
accessibility is (and is not) committed to. As stated, the principle that we 
are working with restricts the epistemic inaccessibility to perspectives 
that are vastly different from one’s own. One could, however, make an 
even stronger claim than this: 
Unrestricted Epistemic Inaccessibility: All experiential perspectives dif-
ferent from the one a person occupies are epistemically inaccessible 
to that person. 
It’s this stronger principle that Nagel’s remarks suggest he would reject. 
To my mind, the fact that he limits his conclusion this way is often 
underappreciated. Yes, in discussing this chapter with students in philos-
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fnd just the right sort of example from the animal kingdom to make his 
point. If he had chosen an example from too far down the phylogenetic 
chain, his claims might have been met with skepticism that the animal 
in question even had an experiential perspective. If he had chosen an 
example from too far up the phylogenetic chain, his claims might have 
been met with skepticism that the animal in question had a suffciently 
different experiential perspective such that access to it was ruled out. But 
in my own teaching experience, even after this point is made and seem-
ingly appreciated, students are still very quick to leap from Nagel’s claim 
that what it’s like to be a bat is inaccessible to anyone (i.e., to anyone 
who is not a bat) to the claim that what it’s like to be anyone other than 
oneself is inaccessible. More generally, there often seems to be a kind of 
amnesia about the restricted nature of Nagel’s claim when the issue of 
epistemic accessibility is directly discussed. 
Why might someone like Nagel choose to endorse the more restrictive
Epistemic Inaccessibility principle over Unrestricted Epistemic Inacces-
sibility? Here it helps to return to a point we saw earlier. For Nagel,
imagination works by operating on material provided by experience.
Imagination performs various kinds of transformations on this material –
combining it with other material, adding or subtracting elements, and
modifying it in various other ways. This means that if we want to under-
stand experiential perspectives different from our own, we have to fnd
some way to leverage the experiences that we’ve had to get to experiences
that we haven’t. In my own previous work, I’ve referred to this process
as imaginative scaffolding (see Kind 2020, 137). We scaffold out from
experiences we’ve had to experiences that we haven’t. On Nagel’s view,
when the experiences we haven’t had are similar to the ones we have had,
this imaginative work is tractable. But, as he notes, “The more different
from oneself the other experiencer is, the less success one can expect
with this enterprise” (Nagel 1974, 442) – and, as we’ve seen, he thinks
there are some cases in which success is impossible. Presumably, this is
also what Spelman has in mind when she claims that imagination can
only enable us to understand an experiential perspective that we already
know a lot about, i.e., it’s only in the cases of perspectives that we know
a lot about that we have the materials needed for successful imaginative
scaffolding. On this line of reasoning, then, what matters for imaginative
access is how different we are from each other, how big a gulf there is. 
This line of reasoning can be roughly schematized as follows, a sche-
matization that I’ll take as the canonical statement of the Too Big a Gulf 
argument: 
1  One cannot have direct experiential access to an experiential per-
spective other than one’s own. 
2  Thus, to have epistemic access to an experiential perspective other 



















246 Amy Kind 
3  To achieve imaginative access to an experiential perspective other 
than one’s own, one must perform various imaginative operations 
on material provided by past experiences. 
4  When an experiential perspective is vastly different from one’s own, 
one’s past experiences do not provide suffcient material for this 
imaginative work. 
5  Thus, one cannot imaginatively access an experiential perspective 
vastly different from one’s own. 
6  Thus, experiential perspectives vastly different from one’s own are 
epistemically inaccessible. 
The key premise here seems to be premise 4. The basic thought seems
to be that whatever kinds of past experiences one has had, they aren’t
derived from the relevant experiential perspective, and since that
experiential perspective is vastly different from one’s own, those past
experiences can’t adequately support the imaginative work that needs
to be done. Considerable weight is being put on the notion of “vastly
different,” a notion that remains largely undeveloped. We know that
for Nagel the experiential perspective of a bat is meant to be taken as
an example of one that is vastly different from the experiential perspec-
tive of a human, and that the experiential perspective of a person born
without the capacity for sight or hearing is meant to be taken as an
example of one that is vastly different from the experiential perspective
of a person with these capacities. But, to return to the examples from
popular culture and public discourse offered at the start of the chapter,
what about the experiential perspective of someone who has been sexu-
ally assaulted, or someone who is grieving the loss of a child, compared
to the experiential perspective of someone who has not undergone the
relevant experience? Or what about the experiential perspective of a
black person in America compared to the experiential perspective of a
white person in America? 
Though it’s not clear how Nagel would answer these questions, these 
do seem to be the sorts of examples that philosophers like Thomas and 
Young have in mind when they offer the Epistemic Arrogance argument 
and discuss matters relating to Epistemic Accessibility. More generally, 
it seems commonplace in discussion of these issues in both philosophical 
and public discourse to treat as unbridgeable the experiential divides 
owing to factors such as race, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, 
and disability, alone or in combination, along with experiential divides 
owing to certain kinds of experiences such as trauma (sexual assault, 
grief, war).3 Though I won’t here attempt a principled delineation of 
what counts as “vastly different,” I’ll assume going forward that it is 
meant to capture at least these kinds of experiential divides. We’ll thus 
be working with what might be thought of as a more expansive interpre-
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Interestingly, despite the importance of premise 4 in the argument, 
very little is typically said on its behalf. Perhaps the main line of defense 
that is offered concerns considerations of embodiment. For example, in 
an insightful discussion of moral imagination, Catriona Mackenzie and 
Jackie Leach Scully argue that “imagination is fundamentally an embod-
ied capacity of mind” and thus that our specifc forms of embodiment 
thereby place signifcant constraints on our abilities to “imaginatively 
put ourselves in the place of others” (Mackenzie and Scully 2007, 342; 
see also Clavel-Vázquez and Clavel Vázquez, ms). While their discussion 
is focused on considerations about disability, and about the limitations 
facing non-disabled people when they attempt to imagine what it’s like 
to be disabled, these considerations presumably extend to other fac-
tors relating to embodiment as well. Whether they would extend more 
broadly to all kinds of “vastly different” experiential perspectives would 
depend on the extent to which these differences depend on differences 
in embodiment. But while their focus is on embodiment, Mackenzie and 
Scully also suggest that there are further limitations on our capacities 
for imaginative projection, namely those arising from “our social and 
cultural context, specifc histories, relationships with others, and pat-
terns of emotional response” (Mackenzie and Scully 2007, 344). It’s my 
sense that it’s considerations of roughly this sort – i.e., the idea that our 
imaginative capabilities are limited by our specifc circumstances, both 
bodily and cultural – that are generally taken to undergird premise 4. 
If what one can imagine is signifcantly limited by who one is, then we 
would have reason to think that experiential perspectives vastly different 
from one’s own are imaginatively out of reach. 
12.4 Pushing Back Against the Pessimism 
The Too Big a Gulf argument strikes many as intuitively plausible, as do 
the considerations adduced in its favor. But despite this intuitive plau-
sibility, I want to try to push back against it, in an effort to show how 
pessimism might reasonably be questioned. 
First, consider a widely shared attitude about literature and literary 
non-fction, namely, that one of its values is precisely to acquaint readers 
with a variety of experiential perspectives that they might not themselves 
occupy.4 One philosopher who has consistently argued for this view is 
Martha Nussbaum. As she’s suggested: “Narrative art has the power to 
make us see the lives of the different with more than a casual tourist’s
interest—with involvement and sympathetic understanding” (Nussbaum 
1997, 88). 
But it’s not just philosophers who take this kind of attitude toward 
literature and literary non-fction. Former President Barack Obama, re-
fecting on his friendship with the novelist Marilynne Robinson, notes 
that in reading her books he was able to draw connections between the 
 
  
   
248 Amy Kind 
people he was seeing everyday – the people whom he was shaking hands 
with and making speeches to – and his grandparents, who were from 
Kansas and ended up journeying all the way to Hawaii, but whose foun-
dation had been set in a very similar setting. It was Robinson’s descrip-
tions of interior life that enabled this. As he put it: 
I think that I found myself better able to imagine what’s going on in 
the lives of people throughout my presidency because of not just a 
specifc novel but the act of reading fction. It exercises those mus-
cles, and I think that has been helpful. 
In the wake of the brutal murder of George Floyd in May 2020, just 
one in a long line of horrifc incidents in which unarmed black men and 
women have been killed by the police, articles containing lists of relevant 
book recommendations fooded news sites and social media feeds. While 
many of these books are non-fction works that are being put forward 
as a way to help white people better understand the workings of struc-
tural racism, many are memoirs or works of fction that are suggested 
as a way of helping whites better understand what it is like to be a black 
person in the United States. From recent books like The Hate U Give, 
Between the World and Me, and The Underground Railroad to classics 
like Native Son and The Invisible Man, the suggestion seems to be that 
it is worthwhile for whites to engage with these books that present ex-
periential perspectives different from their own, and moreover, that it is 
worthwhile at least partly because it may enable a better understanding 
of these perspectives.5 
Philosopher Susan Brison provides an especially clear statement of this 
kind of sentiment in connection with her discussion of the autobiograph-
ical essay The Alchemy of Race and Rights by Patricia J. Williams. De-
scribing this work as “groundbreaking,” Brison notes that Williams’ 
descriptions of the experiences of her great-great-grandmother, as well 
as her descriptions of the racism that she herself has experienced in or-
dinary life, provide us “imaginative access to what it’s like to be the 
victim of racial discrimination” (Brison 2003, 6).6 Elaine Scarry, who is 
generally skeptical about our ability to imagine other people, mentions 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Passage to India as playing a similar function 
of enabling imaginative access, though she thinks these are exceptional 
cases (Scarry 2002, 104–5). If literature can do this, then we should 
reject the Too Big a Gulf argument. 
This quotation from Brison – and more generally, the quotations we 
have just seen in our discussions of the value of literature and literary 
non-fction – typically describes this value in terms of imaginative access 
to an experiential perspective. I take it that imaginative access is meant 
to be a success term, i.e., the relevant imaginings are meant to succeed 
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But it may be important that these claims are not put in terms of know-
ing what it’s like to occupy that experiential perspective. This brings 
me to a second point. In resisting the case for pessimism and leaving 
the door open for people to have epistemic access to experiential per-
spectives vastly different from their own, one might try to differentiate 
epistemic access from knowledge. Epistemic access may well consist in a 
different kind of epistemic state. 
Perhaps it’s when the claim is put in terms of knowledge, e.g., when 
it’s claimed that someone who hasn’t been sexually assaulted can know
what that experience is like, that the claim seems particularly callous 
or arrogant, and when it seems most open to the charge that it’s been 
overstated. It also opens the door to more general worries about skep-
ticism that it might be better to avoid. But someone who wants to re-
sist pessimism need not make the claim this way. One possibility, for 
example, would be to describe the relevant epistemic state in terms of 
understanding, where understanding is meant to be importantly differ-
ent from knowledge. For example, while knowledge is typically taken 
to be all-or-nothing, understanding is thought to come in degrees (see, 
e.g., Kvanvig 2003, Elgin 2009). This allows for to the following line of 
resistance to pessimism: For someone to count as having epistemic ac-
cess to an experiential perspective vastly different from their own, what 
matters is that they have deep or signifcant understanding of it, even if 
that understanding is not complete.7 
Third, it’s important to note that Epistemic Inaccessibility, even in 
the restricted form that we’ve been considering, makes a very strong 
claim. What’s claimed is not just that it is hard to imaginatively cross 
certain kinds of experiential divides, or that we should be less conf-
dent in our ability to imaginatively cross certain kinds of experiential 
divides. Rather, what’s claimed is that it’s in principle impossible to cross
such experiential divides. Thus, one can resist Epistemic Inaccessibility 
without committing oneself to the claim that crossing such experiential 
divides is easy or commonplace. One might insist, in fact, that in many 
cases, the epistemic work is likely to be exceptionally diffcult.8 Once
we recognize that distinction, I think we can come to see that many of 
the expressions of pessimism that we fnd in the literature are better un-
derstood as expressions of this weaker form of pessimism, namely, that 
actually bridging these epistemic divides is extraordinarily diffcult and 
likely quite a rare achievement. 
Consider, for example, Cliff Sosis’s interview with George Yancy as 
part of the What Is It Like to Be a Philosopher series. Throughout the in-
terview, Yancy points to various failures of understanding across the ra-
cial divide, in particular, failures by white people to understand the 
experiences of black people. In response, Sosis worries that Yancy may 
“underestimate our ability to empathize with each other a bit […]. We 
don’t all have the same struggles, but we can understand the struggles of 
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others. I mean, I’m not a bat.” Yancy’s long response is well worth read-
ing in its entirety, as is the whole interview, but I’ll just quote the section 
of it that is especially important for our purposes: 
you don’t need to be a bat to fail to understand what it is like to 
be Black or a person of color. Being white in America will do the 
trick. […] Your question is a good one, but I don’t think that I’m 
underestimating the extent to which white people can’t or don’t em-
pathize with Black people or people of color. Again, this might also 
be linked to the ways in which so much of our culture (visual or not) 
requires Black people and people of color to empathize with white 
people. This is because it is necessary for Black people, for exam-
ple, to have a kind of dual cognitive skill where we are forced to 
understand what goes on within the white world and what goes on 
within our own worlds. White people, can, for the most part, avoid 
our world, avoid Black children’s literature (the very few books 
out there dealing with Black children and their lives), avoid serious 
Black characters playing serious roles in movies. I don’t think the 
imagination and intelligence of white people under white supremacy 
help them to empathize with Black people or people of color. White 
history has proven that; it isn’t just my pessimism. 
(Yancy 2016, my emphasis) 
In describing this empathetic understanding as something white peo-
ple “can’t or don’t” do, Yancy seems to remain agnostic between the two 
forms of pessimism just distinguished. Moreover, in pointing to white 
supremacy as at least partly responsible for this failure, Yancy seems to 
leave open the possibility that things might in principle be different – if 
somehow we were to eradicate white supremacy, for example. In fact, the 
references to black literature and black flm suggest one thing that could 
be done in an effort to make things different (a point that underscores 
our above discussion of the value of literature). Yancy’s suggestion that 
black people are capable of achieving an understanding of white people 
suggests that this kind of gulf between experiential perspectives – that is, 
a racial gulf – is not the kind of gulf that Epistemic Inaccessibility should 
rule out. Granted, Yancy does offer reasons to think that the gulf is not 
a symmetrical one, reasons that show why white-to-black understanding 
should be treated differently from black-to-white understanding. This 
point is also familiar from discussions of W.E.B. Du Bois’s notion of 
double consciousness. (See also the discussion of the insider-outsider in 
Wylie 2003.) But even in this forceful expression of pessimism, the case 
made seems to favor it’s-extraordinarily-diffcult pessimism rather than 
it’s-impossible-pessimism. 
Another forceful expression of pessimism comes in a paper by Janine 
Jones addressing similar issues about white-to-black understanding. 
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Jones focuses on the class of white people she calls “goodwill whites.” 
Whereas some white people who harm blacks know that they’re doing so 
and mean to be doing so, goodwill whites do not realize that this is what 
they’re doing. Jones argues that goodwill whites are often unable to ar-
ticulate what they are, since they are unable to articulate their identity 
in terms of whiteness. They see race as “something that others possess. 
Whites are just ‘normal’.” As she goes on to argue: 
Whites’ inability to form the belief that they are white skews the 
nature of the relationships that exist between whites and blacks. It 
affects their ability to empathize because they are unable to import 
an ingredient essential to empathy: an appreciation of their own 
situation. 
(Jones 2004, 70)9 
Jones speaks of inability here, but I don’t think she means this to be an 
inability in principle. Later in the paper this becomes clear when she 
takes up the question of whether it would be possible for a goodwill 
white person to “see into [the] heart” of a black person, even though 
they often don’t. In a passage addressed to a young black child, she an-
swers this question in the affrmative: 
I would say that in some instances they may not be able to do so 
because they do not possess a retrievable source analogue to match 
your experience. Moreover, unable to appreciate either your situa-
tion or their own, they are unable to map a constructed source an-
alogue of their experience onto yours. And yet in some cases I think 
they can see in your heart. They can empathize with you because as 
human beings living in a society with at least some important shared 
lived experiences and shared stories, they can either retrieve or con-
struct experiences that map onto some of your experiences. 
(2004, 78) 
Jones’ description here of the process that a goodwill white person might 
undertake looks to be a form of imaginative scaffolding mentioned ear-
lier. Though Jones’ essay undoubtedly puts her in the pessimistic camp, 
her pessimism too looks to be a form of it’s-extraordinarily-diffcult pes-
simism rather than of it’s-impossible-pessimism.10 To my mind, how-
ever, this former kind of pessimism is really a kind of optimism – or at 
least it gestures in the direction of optimism. If one comes to recognize 
that something thought to be impossible is in fact possible, even though 
it’s really, really hard, that might give one some reason for hope. I won’t 
here quibble over how exactly this position should be classifed. But in-
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So where does all this leave the Too Big a Gulf argument? In my view, 
the argument as it stands should be rejected. The problem, as our discus-
sion has made clear, is with the fourth premise: 
4 When an experiential perspective is vastly different from one’s own, 
one’s past experiences do not provide suffcient material for this 
imaginative work. 
Given the intended sense of “vastly different,” one that takes the class of 
experiential perspectives thereby captured to be an expansive one, the 
premise is false. 
One option to salvage the argument, then, would be to adjust this 
premise. Perhaps one might fnd a different way to categorize the rel-
evant class of experiential perspectives that are imaginatively inacces-
sible, or perhaps one could develop a less expansive understanding of 
what counts as “vastly different.” Either way, though some version of 
the Epistemic Inaccessibility principle might then be supported, it will 
not be a version that excludes, in principle, the possibility of one person 
having epistemic access to an experiential perspective different from her 
own with respect to race and gender, for example. Though it may turn 
out to be true that some experiential perspectives are indeed epistem-
ically inaccessible to someone who does not occupy that perspective, 
these will be much fewer than has been thought, and it will not include 
many of the kinds of experiential divides that people have often claimed 
to be unbridgeable. Absent another kind of argument, one that does not 
simply rely on the kinds of considerations that allowed Nagel to draw his 
conclusions about the in-principle unbridgeable divide between humans 
and bats, we are not entitled to draw the same conclusion about in-
principle unbridgeable divides between humans occupying these kinds 
of experiential perspectives. 
12.5 Epistemic Arrogance Reconsidered 
At this point, however, the concerns we looked at earlier in the con-
text of discussing the Epistemic Arrogance argument return with even 
more force. The upshot of those considerations, recall, was that indi-
viduals should refrain from engaging in the imaginative project of try-
ing to imagine experiential perspectives vastly different from their own; 
engaging in this project is taken to be morally problematic. If this is 
right, then successfully resisting pessimism is a kind of Pyrrhic victory 
for the optimist about imagination. Thus, in this section I want to push 
back against the Epistemic Arrogance argument. Though the attempt 
to imagine across experiential perspectives may indeed be fraught with 
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Behind the Epistemic Arrogance argument are concerns about re-
spect, or, perhaps better put, disrespect. Recall the points we saw above. 
When we engage imaginatively with someone’s experiential perspective 
rather than listening to them, we fail to treat them with respect. When 
we tell someone that we know how they feel rather than listening to 
them, we fail to treat them with respect. Moreover, to extend the points 
we saw above, when we take the deliverances of our own imaginings 
to outweigh what others are telling us, we also fail to treat them with 
respect. Thomas puts this last point especially clearly, noting the wrong-
ness inherent in “discount[ing] the feelings and experiences of persons 
in diminished social category groups simply because their articulation 
of matters does not resonate with one’s imaginative-take on their expe-
riences” (Thomas 1998, 375). To avoid this wrongness, Thomas advises 
that we adopt an attitude of moral deference, an attitude that requires 
that we really listen to the stories that others tell – where really listening 
requires not only that we pay close attention to the nuances of what’s 
being said and to the emotions being expressed, but that we also under-
stand the vulnerabilities in play and are appropriately moved on account 
of all of these things. 
All of these points, however, seem to presuppose a certain incompat-
ibility between imagining and listening. The assumption seems to be 
something like the following: When we engage with someone else, we 
can either listen to them or we can engage imaginatively with them – 
where the “or” here is meant to be exclusive. But this strikes me as a false 
dichotomy. Why can’t we do both? And moreover, why shouldn’t we do 
both? In particular, suppose we were to do both as part of an ongoing 
practice where what we learn from listening to someone else – from 
really listening to them, in Thomas’ sense – helps inform our imagina-
tion. Perhaps it’s precisely what we learn from listening that enables us 
to make sure that our process of imaginative scaffolding is an effective 
one. In fact, I’m inclined to think that part of what makes someone a 
good imaginer – what makes them able to have broader and better imag-
inative access – is that they are a good listener. 
As a general matter, imagining that operates in a vacuum is unlikely 
to be helpful to us epistemically. We know this to be true when we’re 
putting imagination to epistemic use in a wide variety of other contexts –
whether we’re trying to plan a vacation or problem-solve or make an im-
portant decision. So it’s no surprise that it’s true in this context of epis-
temic use as well. Successful uses of imagination will be informed by the 
world, informed by what we’re hearing, informed by what we’re seeing, 
and informed by what others are telling us they are hearing and seeing. 
Sometimes, as Thomas notes, there will be conficts between what 
others are telling us and what we imagine. And, as he says, it would be 
problematic were we to discount what they are telling us simply because 
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their articulation of matters does not resonate with our imaginative take
on their experiences. But I take there to be some importance to the fact 
that this rough principle is put in terms of simply because. Thomas thus 
leaves open the possibility that there may be times when, given other 
factors that may be in play, our imaginings do allow us to discount what 
others are telling us. Determining whether, and if so when, such dis-
counting might be appropriate is an extremely complicated matter. But 
we might recognize these complications, and recognize that there are 
many hard questions here unanswered, without taking these facts to 
entail that we have no imaginative access to the experiential perspectives 
of other people.11 
Clearly there are important insights behind the Epistemic Arrogance 
argument. Moral deference and humility are important. Imagining can-
not be a substitute for listening. We need to listen to other people and 
to take seriously what they are saying – if we don’t, our imaginings are 
likely to be inaccurate, uninformative, and of little value. We need to be 
humble about what our imaginings are telling us. But none of this sug-
gests any in-principle limits on imagination. 
To my mind, the main upshot of the Epistemic Arrogance argument is 
that we must proceed with caution – in fact, with extreme caution. This 
general upshot can be made more specifc in various ways. Let me give 
two examples. 
First, even if there do turn out to be cases in which we can imagine an 
experiential perspective different from our own, cases in which it turns 
out that we do know what it’s like to have an experience that we haven’t 
had, it doesn’t mean that it will be acceptable in those cases to say to 
someone who has had the relevant experience: “I know how you feel.” 
There are all sorts of reasons that, in many circumstances, this is an in-
appropriate response.12 Indeed, this is often a problematic response even 
when you do share someone’s experiential perspective or when you have 
been through the same type of experience that they have been through. 
To say something like this may seem to rob the person of their dignity 
and of their sense of the uniqueness of their own experience. Moreover, 
saying something like “I know how you feel” typically functions to shift 
the conversation. Now it’s about you and your feelings rather than about 
them and their feelings. Thus, this kind of claim might be seen as a kind 
of conversational narcissism. But here again, we can recognize the im-
portance of not saying this kind of thing, of listening, without denying 
the capabilities and reach of imagination. 
Second, when one achieves understanding of a certain experiential 
perspective via imaginative projection, one might not have the same li-
cense to act as someone who has this understanding in virtue of oc-
cupying the experiential perspective. Consider the following analogy. 
Suppose a friend has an important insight about the current political sit-
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other friends, the relevant topic comes up, and you jump in to share your 
friend’s insightful point instead of letting her share it herself. Even if you 
give her credit for the insight in the retelling, it seems perfectly reason-
able for your friend to be annoyed. It was her point, and she wanted to 
be the one to share it. The fact that you have just as good an understand-
ing of the point doesn’t change things. A similar dynamic will be in play 
with respect to understanding of an experiential perspective that you’ve 
gained by imaginative projection. Given that it’s not your experiential 
perspective, there will be various limits on your capacity to act on that 
understanding – representing that perspective in conversation, using cer-
tain pieces of language, and so on. 
Finally, it’s worth drawing out one last moral from our discussion
of the Epistemic Arrogance argument. As we have seen, defenders of
this argument point to problems inherent in the imaginative project of
trying to imagine experiential perspectives vastly different from one’s
own. As we have also seen, they suggest that we would be better off
listening to what people with vastly different experiential perspectives
have to say. I have already pointed out that these projects need not be
seen as oppositional to one another. But there’s a further important
point here to be made. The suggestion that we can learn about experi-
ential perspectives different from our own by way of listening to what
people tell us is itself reason to reject Epistemic Inaccessibility. To re-
turn to a passage quoted earlier, when Spelman says that “if I only rely
on my imagination to think about you and your world, I’ll never come
to know you and it,” this seems to imply that there is some way that I
can come to know about you and your world – even if that way is not
by imagination (or not only by imagination). These gulfs aren’t too big
to cross. Ironically, perhaps, consideration of the Epistemic Arrogance
argument may thus give us a different sort of way to push back against
pessimism. 
12.6 Concluding Remarks 
My goal in this chapter has been to make room for the denial of pes-
simism, or, at least, the particularly deep form of pessimism that sees 
an impossibility in bridging experiential divides. As I have suggested, 
the two arguments considered – the Epistemic Arrogance argument and 
the Too Big a Gulf argument – do not provide adequate reason for us 
to think Epistemic Inaccessibility is true. Even if the sorts of epistemic 
divides that we’ve been considering might be extraordinarily diffcult 
to cross, we have not yet been given any reason to think that they are 
in principle unbridgeable. Perhaps there are additional arguments that 
might be given, but in the absence of any such arguments, there is no 
special reason to take pessimism as the default assumption, and the way 
seems to be cleared for a defense of optimism. 
 
 1 See, e.g., Clavel-Vázquez and Clavel Vázquez (ms): “That it is not possible 
to fully know what it is like being someone else is an uncontroversial philo-
sophical claim.” 
 2 For the purposes of this chapter, I’m granting this assumption. But one might 
question this by pointing to blind people who have developed echolocatory 
skills, for example. The possibility of virtual reality simulations of bat-hood 
would also be relevant. One might also question how different echolocation 
is from audition. See Allen-Hermanson (2019). 
 3 See, for example, L.A. Paul’s claim: 
If you are a man who has grown up and always lived in a rich Western 
country, you cannot know what it is like to be an impoverished woman 
living in Ethiopia, and if she has never left her village, she cannot know 
what it is like to be a man like you. If you are a white businessman living 
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Of course, even with the way cleared for this defense of optimism, 
considerable work would need to be done to mount it. Much more needs 
to be said about how these imaginative projects might work and about 
how, precisely, the imaginative scaffolding might be built. Moreover, 
there are all sorts of good reasons to think that the scaffolding process 
will be diffcult. For example, as noted above, our own situatedness – 
bodily, societally, and culturally – affects the experiences that we have 
to draw on. And even in cases where the situatedness of one experiential 
perspective shares much in common with the situatedness of another, 
there will still be all sorts of important differences, many of which are 
diffcult to tease out. (For discussion, see Thomas 1998, 365.) 
Several other hard questions still remain unaddressed. One was noted 
in passing earlier: What, exactly, is the epistemic state yielded via imag-
inative access? Is it knowledge, understanding, or something else en-
tirely? Another especially hard question that I have not done justice to in 
this chapter concerns what, exactly, we are trying to access in imagina-
tion. As I noted at the start of Section II, the notion of experiential per-
spective in play throughout my discussion is one regarding broad types 
of experiential perspectives: What it’s like to be the survivor of sexual 
assault, or to be a parent who has lost a child, or to be black in America. 
As I also noted, these perspectives are not monolithic ones. Not everyone 
who has been sexually assaulted, or every grieving parent, or every black 
American shares exactly the same perspective. Nor does every bat, for 
that matter – or at least, so I assume. I’ve treated the question before 
us as if it’s a question about broad types largely because that is how it’s 
often treated in the literature.13 But whether this is the right way to pur-
sue these imaginative projects needs further scrutiny, as do the related 
questions of what exactly this broad type is and what it would mean 
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in San Francisco in 2013 you cannot know what it was like to be a black 
man involved in the Jamaican rebellion in 1760, hiding out in the forest 
in the dead of night while British troops comb the island trying to hunt 
you down, or know what it was like to be a slave in the American south. 
(Paul 2014, 7) 
 4 I am focusing only on literature and literary non-fction, but these consider-
ations might be extended to other kinds of works ranging from music and 
art to virtual reality simulations and video games. 
 5 For example, in “A Year of Anti-Racism Work,” a week-by-week list com-
piled by Michelle Panchuk, people are tasked not just to check out a book 
written by a black woman, or a book by and about Asian-Americans, but 
also to “make sure you are empathetically engaged with the book you are 
reading.” 
 6 Interestingly, Brison’s own book Aftermath has also been described as one 
that provides imaginative access to an experiential perspective that many 
readers may not share, namely, that of the experience of a rape survivor. 
See the blurb on the publisher’s website at https://press.princeton.edu/books/ 
paperback/9780691115702/aftermath. 
 7 Moreover, while knowledge is generally viewed as factive, some epistemolo-
gists have argued that understanding is not factive. Scientists might increase 
their understanding when they move from one false theory to another, better 
theory – even when that second theory is still false. See Elgin 2009 for an ar-
gument to this effect. That understanding need not be factive seems directly 
relevant to the debate about epistemic arrogance. 
 8 Perhaps one way to raise a worry for the “impossible in principle” claim 
would be to say something like this: Someone who isn’t a survivor of sexual 
assault could come to know what it’s like to be such a survivor if they were to 
be sexually assaulted; thus, it’s not impossible in principle for them to come 
have this knowledge. This is not the kind of worry I mean to be raising. My 
worry about the “impossible in principle” claim of Epistemic Inaccessibility 
arises even if we keep fxed the fact that the individual in question does not 
occupy the relevant experiential perspective. 
 9 Though the point is put in terms of “empathy” in this quotation, Jones else-
where talks of “empathetic understanding,” and I think her overall discus-
sion suggests that she has something very similar in mind to the kind of 
epistemic access we’ve been talking about. 
 10 Likewise for Mackenzie and Scully, discussed earlier (see Section III). In 
discussing whether someone with “normal” hands could imaginatively proj-
ect themselves into the perspective of someone with ectrodactyly (a genetic 
condition that results in missing fngers and toes), they note that “it is likely 
to be extremely diffcult” (Mackenzie and Scully 2007, 344). As should be 
clear, this is less pessimistic than Epistemic Inaccessibility. 
 11 Analogous issues arise, I think, in discussions within feminist standpoint 
epistemology about the epistemic privilege thesis. As many feminist theorists 
have pointed out, the claim of epistemic privilege here does not mean that 
such knowledge is automatic. Alison Wylie, for example, explicitly argues 
that feminist standpoint epistemology “must not be aligned with a thesis of 
automatic epistemic privilege; standpoint theorists cannot claim that those 
who occupy particular standpoints […] automatically know more, or know 
better, by virtue of their social, political location” (Wylie 2003, 28; see also 
McKinnon 2015). 
12 That’s not to say it will always be a problematic response. There might well 
be times when an acknowledgment that someone else understands how you 
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feel may be both helpful and reassuring. Along these lines, Adam Smith 
remarks that “nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a 
f ellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast” (Smith 1759/2002, 
17). Thanks to Adrienne Martin for helping me to see this point. 
 13 See, e.g., Nagel’s claim that “The point of view in question is not one acces-
sible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type” (Nagel 1974, 441). Or 
see Thomas’s discussion of moral deference where he talks of perspectives in 
terms of “social category groups” (see, e.g., 1998, 364). 
 14 I am grateful to my students in the fall 2016 and fall 2017 iterations of my 
“Experience” course for sparking many of the ideas underlying this chapter. 
These ideas were frst publicly aired in a talk called “Imagining Others” at 
the Claremont McKenna College Athenaeum in 2018. I subsequently pre-
sented this work in a version of the paper much closer to the present one 
at the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology in San Antonio, the 
University of Fribourg, California State University Long Beach, Institut Jean 
Nicod, and the London Aesthetics Forum. I am grateful to those audiences 
for their questions and helpful feedback. In preparing the fnal version of this 
chapter, I benefted greatly from comments by Christopher Badura, Peter 
Kung, Frank Menetrez, and Nick Wiltsher. 
References 
Allen-Hermanson, Sean. 2019. “So that’s What It’s Like?” In Kristin Andrews 
and Jacob Beck, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal 
Minds. New York: Routledge, 157–68. 
Brison, Susan. 2003. Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Clavel-Vázquez, Adriana, and Clavel Vázquez, María Jimena. ms. “Embodied 
Imagination.” Unpublished. 
Elgin, Catherine. 2009. “In Understanding Factive?” In Duncan Pritchard, Al-
lan Miller, and Adrian Hadock, eds., Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 322–30. 
Gilroy, Paul. 2005. Postcolonial Melancholia. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Jones, Janine. 2004. “The Impairment of Empathy in Goodwill Whites for 
 African Americans.” In George Yancy, ed., What White Looks Like. New 
York: Routledge, 65–86. 
Kind, Amy. 2016. “Imagining Under Constraints.” In Amy Kind and Peter 
Kung, eds., Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 145–59. 
Kind, Amy. 2018. “How Imagination Gives Rise to Knowledge.” In Fabian 
Dorsch and Fiona Macpherson, eds., Perceptual Memory and Perceptual 
Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 227–46. 
Kind, Amy. 2020. “What Imagination Teaches.” In Enoch Lambert and John 
Schwenkler, eds., Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Expe-
rience, Choice, and Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 133–46. 
Kvanvig, John. 2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understand-
ing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mackenzie, Catriona and Jackie Leach Scully. 2007. “Moral Imagination, Dis-
ability and Embodiment.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (4): 335–51. 
 Bridging the Divide 259 
McKinnon, Rachel. 2015. “Trans*formative Experiences.” Res Philosophica 92 
(2): 419–40. 
Nagel, Thomas. 1974. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 
83 (4): 435–50. 
Nussbaum, Martha. 1997. Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Re-
form in Liberal Education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Paul, L.A. 2014. Transformative Experience. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Rankine, Claudia. 2015. “The Condition of Black Life is One of Mourning.” 
The New York Times. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/ 
magazine/the-condition-of-black-life-is-one-of-mourning.html. 
Scarry, Elaine. 2002. “The Diffculty of Imagining Other People.” In Martha 
Nussbaum and Joshua Cohen, eds., For Love of Country? Boston, MA: Bea-
con Press, 98–110. 
Smith, Adam. 1759/2002. Theory of Moral Sentiments. Edited by David D. 
Raphael and Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Spelman, Elizabeth. 1988. Inessential Woman. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
Thomas, Laurence. 1998. “Moral Deference.” In Cynthia Willet, ed., Theoriz-
ing Multiculturalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 359–81. 
Wylie, Allison. 2003. “Why Standpoint Matters.” In Robert Figueroa and San-
dra Harding, eds., Science and Other Cultures. New York: Routledge, 26–48. 
Yancy, George. 2016. Interview by Cliff Sosis: What it is Like to Be a Philosopher. 
Available at http://www.whatisitliketobeaphilosopher.com/george-yancy 
Young, Iris Marion. 1997. Intersecting Voices. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. 
